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Legal Ethics’ Next Frontier: Lawyers  
and Cybersecurity 
Eli Wald*
The publication of the Panama Papers containing confidential 
client information, following a cybersecurity breach at the law 
firm of Mossack Fonseca, demonstrated what many have long 
known, that law firms are particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks.1
Yet since concerns about law firms’ cyber practices have first 
surfaced, the legal profession has learned a lot about cybersecurity. 
We know who is perpetrating cyberattacks against lawyers, we 
know why they are doing it, and we even know quite a bit about 
how to prevent and defend against attacks, as well as how to 
mitigate their damage and respond when an attack takes place. 
Still, there are quite a few things we do not know. Most 
importantly, we do not know the extent and scope of cyberattacks 
against law firms, and we do not know whether lawyers are 
acting on the growing body of cybersecurity knowledge they 
possess to reasonably protect their clients’ information from 
unauthorized access. Indeed, we have reason to believe that some 
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School of Law for their helpful comments. I also thank Diane Burkhardt, Faculty Services 
Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver Sturm College of 
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1 On the Panama Papers, see Luke Harding, What Are the Panama Papers? A Guide 
to History’s Biggest Data Leak, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers [http://perma.cc/PG79-
Z7HM]; David Z. Morris, The Laughably Bad Security at ‘Panama Papers’ firm Mossack 
Fonseca, FORTUNE (Apr. 9, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/09/bad-security-panama-
papers/ [http://perma.cc/453A-ZXZB]. The Federal Bureau of Investigation publicly identified 
law firms as vulnerable in 2009, see Susan Hansen, Cyber Attacks Upend Attorney-Client 
Privilege, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-03-19/cyber-attacks-force-law-firms-to-improve-data-security [http://perma.cc/ 
8LSR-5UEQ]. The FBI reiterated its caution in 2011, calling on major law firms to raise 
their level of awareness regarding cyberattacks. See Anne Marie Davine, More Cyber 
Preparedness Needed, According to 2014 Law Firm Cyber Survey, MARSH (Jan. 15, 2015), 
https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/more-cyber-preparedness-needed-2014-law-firm-cyber-
survey.html [http://perma.cc/5SFK-TTQ9]. FBI officials and security experts maintain 
that law firms remain a weak link when it comes to online security. Id.
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lawyers, notwithstanding their awareness of cybersecurity threats, 
fail to take reasonable steps to protect themselves and their clients, 
because they are underregulated, likely to escape any meaningful 
consequences for their inaction, and therefore, have little incentive 
to take reasonable cybersecurity action. 
Lawyers’ cybersecurity conduct is underregulated because 
the usual regulatory suspects, liability rules and market controls, 
do not rigorously apply. Since proving cybersecurity damages is 
often hard to do, lawyers do not systematically face the prospect 
of malpractice liability for failing to adequately protect clients’ 
information. Since lawyers are generally under no duty to report 
cyberattacks to their clients or to others, they do not face market 
sanctions, such as being fired or suffering reputational losses. Of 
course, some lawyers have been at the forefront of practicing 
diligent cybersecurity. Yet, because practicing cybersecurity is 
expensive and the technological learning curve for lawyers is 
steep, in the face of underregulation and few practical consequences 
for inaction, some lawyers may fail to reasonably defend against 
cyberthreats, the known risks notwithstanding.2 Moreover, because 
malpractice lawsuits are scarce, there is little in the way of 
judicial exposition of the meaning of reasonable cybersecurity 
practices, leaving even those lawyers who are committed to 
practicing reasonable cybersecurity in the dark.
This Article argues that the underregulation of lawyers’ 
cybersecurity conduct may be addressed by the promulgation of 
robust rules of professional conduct, delineating the meaning of 
reasonable cybersecurity protections and mandating greater 
disclosure of unauthorized access to clients. Effective rules of 
professional conduct are likely to incentivize lawyers to take 
action for three related reasons. First, the threat of discipline will 
motivate some lawyers to take reasonable cybersecurity action and 
advise clients when attacks result in compromised information. 
Second, a mandatory disclosure duty will in turn enable more 
effective market regulation as clients will be able to sanction 
lawyers for inaction. Third, the promulgation of effective 
cybersecurity rules may result in peer pressure and the 
development of reasonable cybersecurity social norms among 
lawyers. 
Part I of the Article summarizes the knowledge lawyers have 
recently gained about cybersecurity, namely, who is attacking 
them, why, and what can be done to defend against cyberattacks. 
2 James R. Silkenat, Privacy and Data Security for Lawyers, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
449, 454 (2015) (“[B]ut in the case of cybersecurity, attorneys sometimes take a more ‘do 
as I say, not as I do’ approach.”). 
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Part II examines the underregulation of lawyers’ cybersecurity 
conduct and its consequences. Part III advances a proposal for a 
regulatory response, in the form of new and revised rules of 
professional conduct. 
I. THE STATE OF LAWYERS’ CYBERSECURITY KNOWLEDGE
The use of technology is pervasive in the practice of law. Like 
many other professions, lawyers e-mail, store information remotely, 
share files, and use mobile devices and wireless networks; their 
“widespread use of electronic records and mobile devices” 
presents “unprecedented challenges.”3 As The ABA Cybersecurity 
Handbook explains, “[c]reating, using, communicating, and storing 
information in electronic form greatly increases the potential for 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, and alteration, as well as 
the risk of loss or destruction.”4 Lawyers must understand and 
respond to these risks in order to protect confidential client 
information, which if compromised, can expose clients to the loss 
of the attorney-client privilege, fraud, negative publicity and 
tarnished business reputations, liability to others, and even 
bankruptcy.5
Over the last few years, however, the legal profession has 
learned a great deal about cybersecurity. Lawyers now know why 
they have become likely targets for hackers, who is perpetrating 
the attacks, and what they can do to minimize the probability 
and severity of attacks before they take place, as well as respond 
to attacks when they happen. This part briefly summarizes the 
growing wealth of information about cybersecurity.  
A. Why Lawyers Are Under (Cyber) Attack 
Lawyers experience cyberattacks for three related 
reasons: they store valuable confidential client information, they 
are likely to be more vulnerable than their clients, and they are 
under increased pressure to take advantage of technologies that 
render them susceptible to attacks. To begin with, cybersecurity 
is traditionally concerned with protecting confidential information, 
3 ABA CYBERSECURITY LEGAL TASK FORCE & SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
LAW, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION 109, ABA 4 (Aug. 2014) 
[hereinafter ABA CYBERSECURITY RESOLUTION], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2014_hod_annual_meeting_109.authch
eckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS7C-JXS7]. 
4 JILL D. RHODES & VINCENT I. POLLEY, THE ABA CYBERSECURITY HANDBOOK: A
RESOURCE FOR ATTORNEYS, LAW FIRMS, AND BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS 41 (2013). See
generally MARC GOODMAN, FUTURE CRIMES – EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED, EVERYONE IS
VULNERABLE, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2015). 
5 Drew T. Simshaw, Legal Ethics and Data Security: Our Individual and Collective 
Obligation to Protect Client Data, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 549, 550, 554 (2015).
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maintaining the integrity of information, and ensuring the 
availability of stored information.6 Protecting confidential 
information is especially important to the legal profession, as all 
lawyers and law firms are depositories of valuable confidential 
information related to the representation of clients. As the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Rules”) explain, protecting confidential information is a 
“fundamental principle” that “contributes to the trust that is the 
hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”7 Confidentiality 
encourages clients “to seek legal assistance and to communicate 
fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or 
legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this 
information to represent the client effectively.”8 Put differently, 
to effectively represent clients, lawyers routinely collect and store 
valuable client information. Because lawyers receive and store 
valuable confidential information pertaining to their clients’ 
matters, they are likely targets for hackers.  
Context always matters in the practice of law,9 and it is 
essential to gaining an understanding of the cybersecurity 
practices of lawyers. Different types of law firms offer different 
types of potential value to hackers in terms of the confidential 
client information they store. For example, hacking large law 
firms, which tend to represent large entity clients,10 is often more 
6 David G. Delaney, Cybersecurity and the Administrative National Security 
State: Framing the Issues for Federal Legislation, 40 J. LEGIS. 251, 251 (2014) (“At its 
core, cybersecurity involves information security or assurance—preserving the 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information.”). The core objectives of 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information inform cybersecurity legislation. 
For example, under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, covered 
entities “must assure their customers (for example, patients, insured individuals, 
providers, and health plans) that the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of 
electronic protected health information they collect, maintain, use, or transmit is 
protected.” See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8334 
(Feb. 20, 2003). Similarly, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), a 
Department of Commerce non-regulatory agency, “provide[s] standards and technology to 
protect information systems against threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information and services.” See Computer Security Resource Center, NIST, 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/csrc.cfm [http://perma.cc/K7RV-XMPR] (last updated Oct. 5, 2010). 
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
8 Id.
9 Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
227, 235–44 (2014); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468,
473, 476, 515–19 (1990); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 799, 814–19 (1992). See generally David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating 
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993). 
10 See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319–20 (1982) (finding that the legal profession consists of two 
categories of lawyers whose practice settings, socioeconomic and ethno-religious 
backgrounds, education, and clientele differ considerably); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN
LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 29–47 (2005) (documenting that 
lawyers work in two fairly distinct hemispheres—individual and corporate—and that 
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efficient than hacking each of the law firms’ large entity clients 
individually.11 Large entity clients tend to store enormous 
quantities of information, though much of it may be of relatively 
little value to hackers, even if they had the resources to comb 
through it following a successful attack. For hackers, large law 
firms are a one-stop shop,12 serving as filters of low value 
material,13 because BigLaw will tend to receive from its clients 
and store only a subset of their vast information, namely, the 
valuable portion of it. Thus, while one might expect large law 
firms to be relatively well-protected, at least compared to smaller 
law firms, the payoff for hackers may be worth the investment. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that small law firms and solo 
practitioners who tend to represent small businesses and 
individual clients14 are not valuable depositories of client 
information. Rather, these lawyers may simply feature a 
different value proposition for hackers. For example, some of 
their clients may not ordinarily store sensitive information 
electronically and, thus, may be immune to cyberattacks. Yet, in 
the context of negotiating a transaction or bringing or defending 
a lawsuit, such clients are likely to collect information and then 
send it to their lawyers, who are likely to store it electronically, 
thus making the latter likely targets for cyberattacks. 
Second, compared with their clients, lawyers are assumed to 
be relatively easy, vulnerable targets for cyberattacks,15 “perceived 
to have fewer security resources than their clients,16 and have 
less of an understanding of and appreciation for cyber risk.”17
Lawyers’ relative cyber vulnerability exposes them not only to 
attacks seeking confidential client information, but also to 
hacking designed to disrupt the integrity and availability of 
information stored by law firms in an attempt to collect ransom 
payments.18
mobility between these hemispheres is relatively limited). 
11 Simshaw, supra note 5, at 550. 
12 Michael McNerney & Emilian Papadopoulos, Hacker’s Delight: Law Firm Risk 
and Liability in the Cyber Age, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1246, 1251 (2013).
13 Alan W. Ezekiel, Note, Hackers, Spies, and Stolen Secrets: Protecting Law Firms 
from Data Theft, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 649, 651 (2013).
14 See supra note 10. 
15 JANE LECLAIRE & GREGORY KEELEY, CYBERSECURITY IN OUR DIGITAL LIVES 128 
(2015).
16 Simshaw, supra note 5, at 550–51. 
17 LECLAIRE & KEELEY, supra note 15, at 128 (2015); RHODES & POLLEY, supra note 
4, at 105 (“Law firms are viewed as a ‘very target-rich environment’ with significantly less 
cybersecurity protection in place than their clients have.”). 
18 See, e.g., Joe Dysart, ‘Ransomware’ Software Attacks Stymie Law Firms, A.B.A. J.
(June 1, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ransomware_software_
attacks_stymie_law_firms [http://perma.cc/M62F-8RT4].
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Once again, attention to context is paramount to the 
understanding of cyberthreats; whereas lawyers representing large 
entity clients are likely to be less sophisticated than their clients 
about cyber risks and have fewer resources and expertise to deal 
with threats, they nonetheless represent clients who know 
enough to insist that their law firms take reasonable 
cybersecurity measures. Lawyers representing small businesses 
and individuals may know as little as their clients about 
cyberthreats, but that is no measure of comfort. Not only do such 
lawyers collect and store their clients’ information electronically, 
exposing it to cyber risk, but they, too, are likely easier targets 
than their clients who have more to lose and, therefore, a 
stronger incentive to protect their sensitive information. Worse, 
small businesses and individuals may erroneously assume that 
lawyers know enough, or at least more than them about 
cybersecurity and that their information will be secure with their 
attorneys. Therefore, they insufficiently inquire and supervise 
their lawyers’ cyber practices.  
Finally, the increased competitiveness and ongoing 
restructuring in the legal profession, both accelerated since the 
Great Recession, tend to make lawyers especially vulnerable to 
cyberattacks. Increased competitiveness in the market for legal 
services has led to the emergence of a dominant “around-the-clock, 
24-7” culture of availability to clients.19 Of course, enhanced 
lawyer availability is often desirable from the clients’ point of 
view, but when accomplished through mobile remote technology, 
it enhances cybersecurity risks.20 Similarly, as competitive 
pressures lead lawyers to resort to greater use of outsourcing and 
artificial intelligence,21 the benefits to clients entail an increased 
risk of cyberattacks. 
B. Who Is Attacking the Legal Profession? 
All lawyers are susceptible to attacks by malicious insiders,22
such as disgruntled current and former lawyers and staff 
members, yet context matters in identifying likely hackers. Large 
law firms representing large entity clients involved in large-scale 
19 Eli Wald, Glass-Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes 
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2264–73
(2010).
20 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1251. 
21 See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous 
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137 (2010); John 
O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will 
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041
(2014).
22 Simshaw, supra note 5, at 552. 
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transactional work are more likely to be targeted by social 
engineers, including state-sponsored hackers,23 and subject to 
corporate espionage and financial crimes.24 Smaller law firms, 
however, while less likely to be attacked by state-sponsored 
actors, still carry valuable information attractive to social 
engineers.25 Government intrusion and surveillance, a growing 
source of cybersecurity concern for lawyers and their clients 
alike,26 may be of particular concern to criminal defense, 
immigration, and intellectual property lawyers.27
C. What Lawyers Can Do About Cyberattacks 
Stopping all cyberattacks is impossible to do. Yet, 96% of 
hacking attacks employ simple techniques, and 97% of attacks 
can be blocked by common security practices that are within the 
reach of even small law firms and solo practitioners.28 These 
common practices include using current virus scanners and 
firewalls, installing patches and updates, using cryptographically 
strong passwords, avoiding risky software downloads from the 
Internet, eschewing the use of public cloud providers or file 
sharing services for sharing documents, avoiding the use of 
web-based e-mail services and public Wi-Fi, replacing the default 
passwords on network hardware, and training employees to 
recognize deceptive (“phishing”) attacks.29 Beyond these basic 
measures, defending effectively against cyberattacks entails 
making decisions about trade-offs between business needs and 
23 Id.
24 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1264. 
25 Carrie A. Goldberg, Rebooting the Small Law Practice: A Call for Increased 
Cybersecurity in the Age of Hacks and Digital Attacks, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 519, 521–22
(2015); see also Noah G. Susskind, Cybersecurity Compliance and Risk Management 
Strategies: What Directors, Officers, and Managers Need to Know, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
573, 579 (2015) (exploring the vulnerability of smaller companies). 
26 Silkenat, supra note 2, at 456; see also Sarah Jane Hughes, Did the National 
Security Agency Destroy the Prospects for Confidentiality and Privilege When Lawyers 
Store Clients’ Files in the Cloud – and What, If Anything, Can Lawyers and Law Firms 
Realistically Do in Response?, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 405, 418 (2014).
27 See, e.g., Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone 
Without Apple, N.Y. TIMES at A1 (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/ 
technology/apple-iphone-fbi-justice-department-case.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4SPB-R96Q];
Devlin Barrett, Justice Department Seeks to Force Apple to Extract Data from About 12 Other 
iPhones, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/article_email/justice-department- 
seeks-to-force-apple-to-extract-data-from-about-12-other-iphones-1456202213-lMyQjAxMTI2
MjIzMzMyMTMwWj. 
28 VERIZON ET AL., 2012 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT (2012), http://www.
verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2012_en_xg.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/GTA4-3DN3]. 
29 Ezekiel, supra note 13, at 649; see also JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE:
INSIDE THE NEW THREAT MATRIX OF DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 239–44 
(2011).
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cybersecurity.30 For example, is a firm willing to make it more 
inconvenient for traveling attorneys or lawyers working remotely 
to access their data, in exchange for more security? When does a 
business imperative of providing speedy service render certain 
actions “worth the risk”?31 Navigating these trade-offs and 
systematically assessing the cyber risks involved in doing 
business requires developing and putting in place a comprehensive 
cybersecurity plan. 
The first element of a comprehensive cybersecurity plan 
entails involving firm leadership in learning about cybersecurity 
threats and making strategic decisions about them.32 This, to be 
sure, does not mean that firm executives need to (or can) become 
cybersecurity experts. It does, however, mean that firm leaders, 
ranging from members of large law firms’ executive committees 
to solo practitioners managing their own practices, must 
understand basic cybersecurity realities to allow them to make 
informed strategic judgments about: what technologies to 
deploy; how to mine advantages to benefit clients and the 
practice, and at what costs and risk level; and what security 
measures to employ. Because putting together a cybersecurity 
plan calls for strategic decision making that must involve firm 
management, law firms would be well-advised to task a 
management-level leader with specific supervisory responsibility 
for cybersecurity planning.
Second, lawyers must know their data—that is, be cognizant 
of the actual information the firm possesses and, in particular, be 
mindful of highly valuable and sensitive information entrusted to 
firm lawyers, encompassing issues such as what information firm 
lawyers are working with and how they are using it. Once 
strategic decisions are made by management, many law firms 
will likely delegate the implementation of cybersecurity details to 
non-lawyers, yet lawyer insight and exercise of judgment 
regarding the nature of client information and its sensitivity 
must inform the design of cybersecurity plans. For example, a 
cybersecurity plan may include different levels of protection 
depending on the circumstances. While a firm may prohibit all 
30 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1265. 
31 Id. at 1265–66. 
32 For example, “should the firm be more worried about an attack that disrupts its 
networks so that attorneys lose access to information, about an attack that reveals 
sensitive data belonging to clients, or about an attack, that exposes the firm's own secret 
business data?” Or, “[w]ho are the actors that might pursue each of these attacks? What 
can the company do to prevent each type of attack or, if the attack happens, to manage its 
consequences?” Id. at 1265; see also Cheryl A. Falvey, Demonstrating Due Diligence in 
Building an Information Security Program, in PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE LEGAL ISSUES
7 (2014).
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lawyers from using public cloud providers, file-sharing services 
for sharing documents, web-based e-mail services, and public 
Wi-Fi while conducting firm business, it may demand using 
cryptographically strong passwords only when receiving or 
sending highly sensitive client information. A firm may delegate 
the creation and maintenance of its cybersecurity plan to 
non-lawyers and may create guidelines for the use of various 
protections, but ultimately, lawyers would have to be educated to 
make judgment calls about what measures to use based on their 
knowledge of their clients’ information. 
Third, following a strategic, management-level risk analysis 
of the trade-offs between cybersecurity and business imperatives 
applied to the actual data a firm possesses, lawyers can then 
delegate day-to-day operations and implementation authority to 
technology experts, either within or outside the firm. A large law 
firm may designate someone internally within its IT department 
for the task, whereas a solo practitioner or a small firm may hire 
an outside expert to help manage its security apparatus. Day-to-day 
implementation of a cybersecurity plan includes two related yet 
distinct tasks: prevention and breach management. Prevention 
includes responsibility for deploying secure technologies, 
restricting access to high-risk activities, and implementing 
cybersecurity policies and procedures. For example, “blocking 
malware, [and] detecting anomalous behavior, such as extraction 
of significant quantities of data off company networks, that can 
indicate a cyberattack.”33 Perhaps most importantly, it entails 
training of lawyers and staff to observe cybersecurity practices.34
The Wall Street Journal reported that “the weakest links at law 
firms of any size are often their own employees, including 
lawyers.”35 Having a plan in the event of a data breach, in turn, 
includes containing an ongoing cyberattack, mitigating its 
damage, and communicating it to clients.36
While lawyers in general may delegate to cybersecurity 
experts the implementation of cybersecurity plans, complex legal 
ethics questions may arise requiring the insight, approval, and 
supervision of lawyers. For example, consider the use of 
honeypots, cybersecurity mechanisms set to detect, deflect, and 
counteract attempts at unauthorized access to protected 
33 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1268. 
34 Simshaw, supra note 5, at 568–69. 
35 Jennifer Smith, Lawyers Get Vigilant on Cybersecurity, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 
2012, 4:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577486761101 
726748.
36 See Mercedes Kelley Tunstall, The Path to Comprehensive Cybersecurity Laws in 
the United States, in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 61, 63 (2015 
ed. 2015). 
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information. Generally, honeypots consist of data that appears to 
be legitimate and thus of value to attackers, but is in fact 
deceptive information planted to attract hackers who are then 
tracked and blocked.37 Among cyber experts, while risky, 
honeypots are considered a valid information security tactic.38
Yet, whether law firms can deploy honeypots raises a 
complicated and unresolved question under the Rules, which 
generally prohibit lawyers from engaging in dishonest or 
deceptive practices in the practice of law.39 Notably, it is a 
question lawyers need to be made aware of and help resolve.  
Finally, law firms must develop a strong culture of 
cybersecurity,40 because cyber “compliance and risk management 
intertwine around corporate culture.”41 Lawyers and staff who 
think of cybersecurity as somebody else’s problem or responsibility 
are prone to make the very mistakes, like opening phishing 
e-mails, that expose a firm to heightened risk. Since a law firm’s 
cybersecurity apparatus is only as safe as its weakest link, 
lawyers and staff must be trained to conceive of cybersecurity not 
as an imposition on doing business, but as an integral part of 
firm culture—that is, to move past thinking of business 
considerations and cybersecurity as a trade-off and accept 
cybersecurity as a business need.42
Context is likely to play an important role in the 
implementation of cybersecurity plans. Some security measures, 
indeed, even some basic security measures such as avoiding the 
use of web-based e-mail services and public Wi-Fi, as well as 
expensive training, may be out of reach for some solo 
practitioners and smaller law firms. Yet, as Carrie Goldberg 
points out, it is in these very types of attorney-client 
relationships that an attorney is likely to be “more stringent and 
informed than the client about necessary information security 
measures.”43 In such instances, a lawyer can enhance the 
cybersecurity of the attorney-client relationship by explaining to 
the client the lawyer’s limited means and the risks entailed, and 
communicating the shared responsibility to maintain privacy, 
37 See Sean L. Harrington, Cyber Security Active Defense: Playing with Fire or Sound 
Risk Management? 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, 14–16 (2014).
38 Id. at 15. 
39 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); see, e.g., In re 
Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002) (disciplining an assistant district attorney who 
misrepresented himself to a suspected murderer as a public defender); see also In re Gatti,
8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (disciplining a lawyer who misrepresented himself as a medical 
professional in order to obtain information related to the representation of a client).
40 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1266. 
41 Susskind, supra note 25, at 608.
42 Id. at 608–12. 
43 Goldberg, supra note 25, at 543.
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especially as it pertains to a client’s voluntary online behavior 
and habits.44
II. THE UNDERREGULATION OF LAWYERS’ CYBERSECURITY
CONDUCT
Critics from the left and the right have long disparaged 
professional ideologies, and rules of professional conduct that 
implement and codify them, as self-serving rhetorical tools meant 
to justify the profession’s power and status,45 monopoly over the 
provision of legal services, and anticompetitive fees.46 At first 
glance, the recent flurry of changes to Rules regarding 
cybersecurity47 appear unnecessary, and thus susceptible to this 
criticism. To begin with, the Rules have long required lawyers to 
protect confidential information and so the promulgation of 
subsection 1.6(c), stating in relevant part that “a lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to prevent the . . . unauthorized 
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to 
the representation of a client,”48 seems like a redundant clause, a 
rhetorical nod regarding cybersecurity. Similarly, the Rules have 
long demanded competence and so the revision of Comment 8 to 
Rule 1.1, stating in relevant part that “to maintain the requisite 
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in 
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks 
associated with relevant technology . . . ,”49 seems perfunctory. 
Moreover, the changes appear unnecessary because on initial 
consideration one would expect clients’ reactions, such as firing a 
law firm following a security breach, withholding new business, 
or filing a malpractice lawsuit, to provide lawyers with ample 
motivation and incentive to reasonably protect clients’ information. 
Cybersecurity thus appears to be the posterchild for advocates of 
market controls and deregulation; instead of promulgating new 
rules of professional conduct, let the market regulate lawyers’ 
cybersecurity conduct. 
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that liability rules (e.g., 
malpractice suits) and market controls (e.g., termination of the 
attorney-client relationship) are not likely to effectively regulate 
lawyers’ cybersecurity conduct.50 Generally, a plaintiff in a 
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE
RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977). 
46 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 185–211
(1999).
47 See infra Section III.A.
48 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
49 Id. r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added). 
50 For a review of disciplinary, liability, institutional, legislative, and market 
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malpractice lawsuit must establish four elements: the existence 
of a duty, breach of the duty owed, causation, and damages.51 Yet 
a plaintiff in a malpractice suit alleging negligence in failing to 
protect information is unlikely to be able to prove “damages 
because of the challenges in answering key questions about 
cybersecurity breaches: who perpetrated the cyberattack; what 
information did they steal; what is the value of that information 
to them or others; and what other harms, such as operational 
disruption, competition, or reputational damage, resulted for the 
victim?”52 Consequently, there are hardly any cases litigating 
attorney (or even corporate) negligence for failure to protect 
confidential information.53
The same challenges—not knowing who perpetrated the 
cyberattack; what information they stole; what is the value of 
that information to them or others; and what other harms, such 
as operational disruption, competition, or reputational damage, 
resulted for the victim—limit the ability of clients to fire or 
otherwise sanction a law firm for failing to protect confidential 
information. Worse, clients are often prevented from reacting to 
lawyers’ cybersecurity inaction because they do not find out 
about it. To be sure, some clients, usually sophisticated and 
powerful entity clients, have been pressuring their law firms to 
put in place cybersecurity measures and others have demanded 
being advised of security breaches.54 Yet lawyers are under no 
general duty to report attacks to clients,55 often do not learn 
about attacks themselves,56 and when lawyers do find out about 
attacks, they often have insufficient information to allow for 
comprehensive reporting to clients.  
Thus, clients often do not find out about lawyers’ 
cybersecurity breaches, and when they do, they have insufficient 
information on which to respond or to successfully sue. 
Unfortunately, underregulation—the inability of clients to 
effectively utilize liability rules and market controls to ensure 
that lawyers face appropriate cyber incentives—compounds the 
controls, see Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 9, at 804–19. See generally
David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers? Managing 
Conflict and Context in Professional Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465 (1996).
51 RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE: THE LAW
OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE § 1:2 (2016). 
52 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1261. 
53 Id. at 1260; see also Hughes, supra note 26, at 426 (“[M]ost data breach class 
actions have been dismissed for lack of damages.”). 
54 See, e.g., Monica Bay, Understanding the Risks to Cybersecurity: Large Law Firms 
Are Viewed as Vulnerable and Store Information that Hackers Know Is Valuable, 36 NAT’L
L.J. 28, 28 (2014). 
55 See infra Section III.A. 
56 Simshaw, supra note 5, at 550–51. 
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underlying problem. As lawyers face insufficient incentives to 
implement appropriate cybersecurity measures and report 
attacks to clients, data about attacks and their consequences 
goes uncollected, diminishing the prospects of effective liability 
rules and market controls developing in the future. This is the 
kind of market failure that is unlikely to resolve itself without 
regulatory intervention, except that liability rules are not likely 
to constitute an effective regulatory response. It is also the kind 
of market failure that prevents the collection of the very data we 
need to better understand the extent of the problem we are facing. 
To be sure, underregulation does not mean that lawyers face 
no regulatory forces pertaining to their cybersecurity conduct. To 
begin with, legislative controls regulate the cyber conduct of 
lawyers. State laws impose on lawyers, and others who hold 
personal information about customers, data breach notification 
duties if they reasonably believe that an unauthorized party has 
obtained the customers’ information.57 In addition, various 
federal statutes address data breach in specific industries. For 
example, attorneys working in the health care industry who have 
access to covered information are subject to the privacy and security 
provisions of the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability 
Act;58 other federal statutes generally regulating data security 
may apply to lawyers as well.59
Next, even in the absence of reported malpractice decisions 
regarding failure to protect confidential client information, 
liability rules may indirectly inform attorneys’ cyber conduct. For 
example, law firms accused of cybersecurity misconduct by 
clients may decide to settle cases to avoid having to publicly 
defend suits risking exposure of embarrassing cyber details and 
consequential reputational harm. Similarly, market controls may 
also inform lawyers’ conduct, even if clients do not learn about 
cyberattacks and compromised information. Powerful clients can 
demand that their lawyers establish reasonable cybersecurity 
policies, and some lawyers, even in the absence of a duty to 
disclose information to clients about cyberattacks, may reveal 
information to build trust in the attorney-client relationship or to 
avoid undermining it upon subsequent disclosure. Other lawyers 
may take cybersecurity action to comply with insurance companies’ 
protocols, even if the risk of malpractice liability is remote. 
57 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1254–55. 
58 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
59 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1256 (describing guidelines advising 
corporations and attorneys to report material cyber risks and incidents to the SEC). 
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Yet other lawyers may respond to social norms, such as peer 
pressure and organically evolving norms within their legal 
communities. For example, as cybersecurity awareness increases, 
and Continuing Legal Education providers flood the marketplace 
with offerings, lawyers may be induced to take a class to keep up 
with the competition. Also, as younger attorneys, likely more 
tech-savvy, join the profession, law firms become both more aware 
of cyber conduct and more apt to engage with it more directly. 
In sum, while the ineffectiveness of traditional liability rules 
and market controls results in the systematic underregulation of 
lawyers’ cybersecurity conduct, other regulatory controls have led 
to significant changes in the cyber habits of some members of the 
legal profession, such as the increased use of two-factor 
authentication in lieu of a single password to access secure 
systems.60 Before turning to explore rules of professional conduct 
as a possible remedy to lawyers’ likely cybersecurity inaction, a 
word about Holmesian bad people.61 Since we do not know enough 
about the extent and scope of cyberattacks against lawyers, 
admittedly in part because lawyers do not gather or share this 
information, why assume that lawyers do not do enough to 
protect their clients’ information and best interests? Even 
conceding a legal world of increased atomism and individualism, 
one in which lawyers and their clients seek to maximize their 
short-term interests with little regard to the impact on others,62
why assume that, but for regulatory intervention, most or even 
many lawyers will act as Holmesian bad people and try to get 
away with implementing insufficient cybersecurity measures? 
Surely some lawyers will do the right thing by their clients 
simply because it is the right thing to do. 
 Regrettably, in addition to the dominance of individualism 
(or the hired gun ideology)63 and the relative decline of relational 
approaches in legal (and business) decision making made by both 
clients and lawyers,64 three interrelated reasons suggest that, 
60 See, e.g., Ellen Blanchard & Rodney Blake, Law Firms Are the New Target for IP 
Theft: Basic Protections, IPWATCHDOG (June 19, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2015/06/19/law-firms-are-the-new-target-for-ip-theft-basic-protections/id=58656/ [http:// 
perma.cc/3G3U-9UBY].
61 See Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a 
Relational Approach Would Improve Professional Rules and Roles, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV.
513, 522–23 (2012). 
62 See Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic 
Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 1, 26–39 (2011).
63 See generally William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and 
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29 (1978). 
64 Pearce & Wald, supra note 62; Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational 
Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and Regulation: The Exaggerated Death of Big Law,
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absent regulatory intervention, some lawyers are likely to try to 
get away with offering insufficient cyber protection to clients and 
acting as Holmesian bad people. 
First, implementing effective cybersecurity measures can 
entail significant expenses. While some costs can be easily rolled 
onto clients, for example, expenses directly related to 
undertaking specific measures in connection with the 
representation of clients with known security risks and needs, 
other expenses, such as the cost of upgrading the entire 
cybersecurity apparatus of the firm or the time investment of 
lawyers and staff learning about the apparatus, may be harder to 
recoup.
Second, even when the costs of implementing cybersecurity 
measures can be recouped, lawyers are notoriously 
technophobic.65 To be sure, some lawyers are at the forefront of 
using new technological advances to better serve clients.66 Yet 
the legal profession has a long, documented history of resisting 
technological advances due to ignorance,67 vanity,68 status envy,69
and independence,70 which suggests that, left to their own 
devices, lawyers are unlikely to implement the necessary 
cybersecurity measures to protect clients’ information. 
Finally, some cybersecurity measures, such as limiting access 
to unsecure networks and mobile devices, abstaining from using 
portable drives, frequent change of passwords, and timely lock 
down of computers in and out of the office, are likely to be 
perceived to be, and indeed are, cumbersome for lawyers. This is 
especially true for older and less technology-savvy attorneys, 
some of whom, by virtue of their seniority, are also likely to be 
powerful within their firms and therefore harder to reign in. In 
sum, because liability rules and market controls are unlikely to 
provide lawyers with a sufficient incentive to take appropriate 
cybersecurity action, and because implementing effective 
cybersecurity measures is expensive, time-consuming, and 
inconvenient, some lawyers are unlikely to reasonably protect 
their clients’ information absent regulatory intervention. 
42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 110 (2013).
65 Timothy J. Toohey, Beyond Technophobia: Lawyers’ Ethical and Legal Obligations 
to Monitor Evolving Technology and Security Risks, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2015).
66 See William Henderson, What the Jobs Are: New Tech and Client Needs Create a 
New Field of Legal Operations, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/what_the_jobs_are [http://perma.cc/WHB9-E4UC]. 
67 See, e.g., Brian E. Finch, The Legal Profession Needs to Get Smart About Cybersecurity,
NAT’L L.J. 27, at 27 (2015). 
68 Vivia Chen, Why is ‘Phooling’ a Lawyer So Easy?, NAT’L L.J. 5, at 5 (2015). 
69 Ezekiel, supra note 13, at 656. 
70 Id.
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III. THE LEGAL ETHICS OF CYBERSECURITY
Professional ideologies and rules of professional conduct 
promulgated by lawyers are often self-serving and warrant a 
healthy dose of skepticism, yet at the same time, they play an 
important and effective role in the regulation of lawyers. As 
liability rules, the rules of professional conduct—part and parcel 
of state law—define misconduct and give rise to a disciplinary 
system that incentivizes lawyers to comply with them.71 As the 
embodiment of professionalism, rules of professional conduct are 
social norms that shape and guide the conduct of lawyers. Thus, 
notwithstanding criticisms of rules of professional conduct and 
acknowledging their chronic underenforcement,72 legal ethics 
rules can play an important role in the regulation of lawyers.73
A. The Current Legal Ethics Stance on Cybersecurity 
To their credit, the Rules have been revised in recent years 
to take account of technological changes impacting the practice of 
law. In August 2012, the ABA House of Delegates renumbered 
Comment 6 to Rule 1.1 on competence as Comment 8 and added 
a clause calling on lawyers to keep abreast of relevant technology 
affecting their practice. While the revision was made to a 
Comment rather than in the body of the Rule, was aspirational 
rather than mandatory, and failed to explicitly identify 
cybersecurity as a concern or a priority (stating instead that “to 
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill” mandated by Rule 
1.1, “a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its 
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with 
relevant technology . . .”),74 the Comment revision was not 
without practical impact. It does open the door to discipline, 
designating ignorance of relevant technology as incompetence 
and thus misconduct, and, by identifying knowledge of relevant 
technology as a component of competence, it did help give rise to 
a cottage industry of Continuing Legal Education courses about 
cybersecurity.75 Notably, however, the Comment does not deem 
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). Rules of 
professional conduct also establish standards of conduct which inform determination of 
civil liability for malpractice. See id. at Preamble & Scope ¶ 20. 
72 Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV.
639, 648 (1981) (“[S]tudy after study has shown that the current rules of professional 
conduct are not enforced.”); Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, supra note 9, at 493 
(noting that the rules of professional conduct tend to be “systematically underenforced”). 
73 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (discussing how legal norms and rules affect professional conduct). 
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added). 
75 Darla W. Jackson, Cybersecurity: Breaches and Heartbleed to BYOD – Are Bankers, 
Entertainment Company Executives, Celebrities, Postal Workers, Ice Cream Lovers, Home 
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the failure to utilize technology or inaction with regard to 
technological risks as incompetent conduct. Rather, all it 
recommends is keeping abreast of benefits and risks of relevant 
technology. 
Arguably, a more significant change was made to Rule 1.6 on 
confidentiality. Elevating a Comment to a new subsection of 
Rule, 1.6(c), the Rule now mandates that “[a] lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to prevent . . . the unauthorized disclosure of, or 
unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation 
of a client.”76 Importantly, exactly because the dearth of malpractice 
litigation regarding failure to protect information results in lack of 
judicial exposition of reasonableness, new Comments 18 and 19 to 
Rule 1.6 do offer a partial definition of reasonable efforts.
After emphasizing the central role of reasonableness, stating 
that “[t]he unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, information relating to the 
representation of a client does not constitute a violation of 
paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent 
the access or disclosure,”77 Comment 18 adds that: 
[f]actors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the 
lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the 
information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are 
not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the 
difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the 
safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients 
(e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively 
difficult to use).78
Comment 19 similarly identifies reasonableness as a key 
term of art, adding that “[w]hen transmitting a communication 
that includes information relating to the representation of a 
client,”79 that is, confidential information,80
the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information 
from coming into the hands of unintended recipients . . . . Factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s 
expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information 
and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected 
by law or by a confidentiality agreement.81
Builders, and CIOs the Only Ones Who Should Be Concerned?, 106 L. LIBR. J. 633, 638
(2014) (noting that the A.B.A. has begun offering a Cybersecurity Series); see also ABA 
Cybersecurity Series, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/ebus/events/ce/cyber-security- 
core-curriculum.html [http://perma.cc/6X3H-LN49]. 
76 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c) (emphasis added). 
77 Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 18. 
78 Id.
79 Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 19. 
80 Id. r. 1.6(a).
81 Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 19 (emphasis added). 
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Comments 18 and 19 take a first important step in defining 
the meaning of “reasonable efforts” to protect clients’ 
information. They correctly identify reasonableness as a key 
element in assessing cybersecurity measures, and they begin to 
define the term, referring to the sensitivity of the information, 
the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not 
employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the 
difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to 
which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to 
represent clients as relevant considerations of reasonableness. 
Yet Rule 1.6(c) and Comments 18 and 19 fall short in several 
respects. First, they fail to require that lawyers put in place a 
cybersecurity plan which will regularly monitor their 
cybertechnology to detect breaches. Perhaps the Comment 
implies a duty to regularly monitor one’s cybersecurity measures, 
after all, how can a lawyer assess “the likelihood of disclosure if 
additional safeguards are not employed” without monitoring the 
performance of existing safeguards? Similarly, assessing “the 
cost of employing additional safeguards” as well as “the difficulty 
of implementing the safeguards” implies a duty to assess one’s 
existing apparatus. But the Comments fail to explicitly identify a 
duty to implement a cybersecurity plan, a noteworthy omission 
given that elsewhere the Comments do explicitly impose similar 
duties. For example, while a duty to monitor for conflicts of 
interest may be implied from a Rule prohibiting conflicts of 
interest, Comment 3 to Rule 1.7 on conflicts of interest explicitly 
states that: 
[t]o determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should 
adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm 
and practice, to determine . . . the persons and issues involved . . . . 
Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not 
excuse a lawyer’s violation of this Rule.82
Yet, while ignorance about cybersecurity attacks and their scope 
appears to be the norm, the Comment to Rule 1.6 fails to 
explicitly demand monitoring for cyberattacks akin to the 
monitoring of conflicts of interest. 
Second, Rule 1.6(c) and its Comment do not sufficiently 
clarify what constitutes “reasonable efforts” and “reasonable 
precautions.” Perhaps, in a world of constantly evolving 
technology, the Comment avoided specifying the nature of 
appropriate measures to prevent it from quickly becoming 
antiquated. Curiously, however, the Comment did not shy away 
82 Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 3. 
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 90 Side A      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 90 Side A      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 4/23/16 10:41 AM 
2016] Legal Ethics’ Next Frontier 519 
from delving into the meaning of reasonableness when such 
analysis benefited lawyers. Comment 19 states in relevant part 
that “[t]his duty,” to take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
unauthorized disclosure of client information, “however, does not 
require that the lawyer use special security measures if the 
method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”83 This innocent sounding clause implicitly refers to ABA 
Formal Opinion 99-413, in which the ABA Standing Committee 
held that “[a] lawyer may transmit information relating to the 
representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the 
Internet without violating the [Rules] because the mode of 
transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a 
technological and legal standpoint.”84
In other words, Comment 19, while ostensibly staying clear 
of defining the meaning of “reasonable efforts,” nonetheless 
states that the use of unencrypted e-mail by lawyers is 
reasonable because apparently unencrypted e-mails “afford[] a 
reasonable expectation of privacy” based on Formal Opinion 
99-413, which found that “[t]he same privacy accorded U.S. and 
commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions, and 
facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail.”85 The point, to be clear, is 
not to debate whether the Committee’s conclusion, made in 1999, 
that unencrypted e-mails afford a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, still holds true presently, although some have 
characterized the conclusion as “misguided.”86 Rather, it is that 
what Comment 19 does half-heartedly and indirectly87—delving 
into the definition of reasonable efforts—it ought to do openly 
and clearly. 
Third, Rule 1.6(c) and its Comment fails to mandate 
disclosure to clients regarding cyberattacks and/or security 
breaches regarding client information. There are at least two 
possible good faith explanations for this omission. To begin with, 
attorney-client communications are generally governed by Rule 
1.4, not Rule 1.6, and so there would be no reason to require 
communications regarding cybersecurity in the latter. Yet the 
83 Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 19. 
84 A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) 
(discussing protection of confidentiality by means of unencrypted e-mail). 
85 Id.
86 Toohey, supra note 65, at 23; see also Rebecca Bolin, Risky Mail: Concerns in 
Confidential Attorney-Client Email, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 601, 618–21 (2012) (discussing 
and critiquing the effect of 99-413). 
87 Curiously, Comment 19 fails to identify Formal Opinion 99-413, although it 
appears to cite its language. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 19 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2013), with ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 
(1999).
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Rules and Comments often explicitly cross-reference other Rules 
such that the failure to reference Rule 1.4 is glaring. Indeed, 
Comment 18 does reference Rules 1.1, 5.1, and 5.3, making the 
omission to reference Rule 1.4 inexplicable. Next, Comments 18 
and 19 do implicitly reference Rule 1.4, both stating in relevant 
part that “[a] client may require the lawyer to implement special 
security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed 
consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be 
required by this Rule.”88 Rule 1.4(a)(1), in turn, states in relevant 
part that “[a] lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any 
decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s 
informed consent . . . is required,”89 such that one could argue 
that the Comments 18 and 19 indirectly reference Rule 1.4 (by 
referring to informed consent, which requires communicating 
with clients). But even viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Rules, such indirect reference to Rule 1.4 is lacking as it fails to 
require disclosure to clients of cybersecurity attacks or breaches. 
It only indirectly triggers a duty to communicate regarding 
forgoing security measures as opposed to imposing a general duty 
to communicate regarding cybersecurity. Furthermore, 
Comments 18 and 19 fail to reference the subsections of Rule 1.4 
that may give rise to a duty to communicate regarding 
cybersecurity concerns, namely 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), and 1.4(b). 
Notwithstanding the silence of Rule 1.6(c), does Rule 1.4 
independently require lawyers to communicate with clients 
regarding cybersecurity, let alone advise clients about 
cyberattacks against the law firm and/or breaches of security? 
Most commentators opining on this issue believe the Rules do not 
impose such a duty,90 and regrettably they appear to be right 
because the Rules essentially only mandate disclosure of 
material information to clients, and the usual uncertainty 
engulfing cyberattacks casts an inherent doubt on the 
materiality of cyberattacks and resulting breaches. 
Rule 1.4(a)(2) states that “[a] lawyer shall . . . reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s 
objectives are to be accomplished.”91 Cybersecurity measures 
certainly qualify as part of the means by which the client’s 
objectives are to be accomplished, and thus would support an 
interpretation pursuant to which a lawyer must reasonably 
88 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 18. 
89 Id. r. 1.4(a)(1).
90 See, e.g., Ezekiel, supra note 13, at 653 (“Most astonishingly, the existing 
professional responsibility standards generally do not require any disclosure to the client 
when client information is stolen from a law firm.”).  
91 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2).
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consult with the client about reasonable security measures, for 
example, whether to encrypt communications regarding the 
representation, but the Rule falls short of explicitly demanding 
such a communication. Therefore, if a lawyer has in place 
cybersecurity measures, or reasonably believes that his 
cybersecurity measures or lack thereof are sufficient, Rule 
1.4(a)(2) does not appear to require any communication 
whatsoever. Worse, Rule 1.4(a)(2) says nothing whatsoever about 
cyberattacks or security breaches. 
Rule 1.4(a)(3) states that “[a] lawyer shall keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter,”92 and 
Comment 3 adds that “paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer 
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or 
the substance of the representation.”93 If cybersecurity measures 
are to be construed as the “means by which the client’s objectives 
are to be accomplished,” they are certainly not the matter, and 
thus, 1.4(a)(3) appears not to generally apply to cybersecurity 
communications. However, a significant cybersecurity breach 
that results in the disclosure of otherwise confidential and 
privileged information, or that foils the negotiation of a 
transaction on behalf of a client, can certainly impact the status 
of a matter. Comment 3 supports that interpretation because a 
significant cybersecurity breach would be a “significant 
development” affecting the substance of the representation.94
In any event, however, Rule 1.4(a)(3) falls short of imposing 
a general duty of communication regarding cybersecurity attacks 
and breaches. Rather, it only mandates disclosure to clients of 
significant cyber breaches which constitute a significant 
development and result in an impact regarding the status of the 
representation. Moreover, the same considerations that obscure 
clients’ ability to prove damages resulting from a lawyer’s failure 
to reasonably protect information—not knowing who perpetrated 
the cyberattack, what information they stole, what the value of 
that information is to them or others, and what other harms, 
such as operational disruption, competition, or reputational 
damage, resulted for the victim—would often shield lawyers from 
discipline for violating 1.4(a)(3). If a lawyer does not know who 
perpetrated the cyberattack, what information was stolen, what 
the value of that information is to them or others, and what other 
92 Id. r. 1.4(a)(3).
93 Id. r. 1.4 cmt. 3. 
94 See Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Ethics Op. 113 (Nov. 19, 2005) (discussing 
the ethical duties of an attorney to disclose errors to a client). 
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harms resulted for the client, how could a lawyer ever conclude 
that a breach constitutes a “significant development”? 
Rule 1.4(b) states that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation.”95 While Rule 
1.4(b) appears to only apply to explaining the “matter” at hand, 
Comment 5 importantly clarifies that:  
[t]he client should have sufficient information to participate 
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation 
and the means by which they are to be pursued . . . . The guiding 
principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client 
expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the 
client’s best interests, and the client’s overall requirements as to the 
character of representation.96
Rule 1.4(b) arguably gives rise to a general duty to 
communicate regarding cybersecurity and, in particular, about 
cyberattacks and breaches because cybersecurity measures are 
part of the means by which the client’s objectives are to be 
pursued. Thus, the client should receive sufficient information 
from the lawyer to be able to participate intelligently in decisions 
concerning cybersecurity. ABA Formal Opinion 95-398 lends 
support to this interpretation, finding that “should a significant 
breach of confidentiality occur . . . a lawyer may be obligated to 
disclose such breach to the client or clients whose information 
has been revealed,”97 citing Rule 1.4(b), and adding that “[w]here 
the unauthorized release of confidential information could 
reasonably be viewed as a significant factor in the 
representation, for example where it is likely to affect the 
position of the client or the outcome of the client’s legal matter, 
disclosure of the breach would be required under Rule 1.4(b).”98
Yet, like Rule 1.4(a)(3), the communication appears to be 
mandated only with regard to severe cyberattacks with 
significant impact on a client, or limited to communications 
regarding cybersecurity “means” rather than a clear general duty 
requiring communication regarding cybersecurity measures, 
attacks, and breaches.99
Some commentators have argued that Rule 1.15 on 
safekeeping property pertains to protecting client information 
because Rule 1.15(a) states, inter alia, that “other property,” 
presumably including information, “shall be . . . appropriately 
safeguarded.”100 No doubt Rule 1.15 applies, if only to impose on 
lawyers a duty to monitor client trust accounts for cyberattacks 
95 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b).
96 Id. r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
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and breaches.101 Yet, the application adds little to Rules 1.6(a) 
and 1.6(c), which impose a general duty to protect clients’ 
confidential information from unauthorized disclosure. 
Rule 5.1, regarding responsibilities of supervisory lawyers to 
other lawyers, and Rule 5.3, regarding supervisory 
responsibilities to non-lawyer assistance, have been slightly 
revised to reflect technological changes. Read together, Rules 5.1 
and 5.3 require some lawyers to supervise the conduct of other 
lawyers and non-lawyers inside and outside of the practice. They 
state that supervisory lawyers “shall make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable 
assurance that,”102 first, “all lawyers in the firm conform to the 
Rules of Professional Conduct,”103 including Rules, such as 1.1 
and 1.6 pertaining to cybersecurity, and second, that the conduct 
of non-lawyers employed by, retained by, or associated with the 
lawyer, “is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer.”104 As one commentator notes: 
These rules reflect the notion that a law firm’s data security practices 
are only as strong as its weakest link. As a result, lawyers must make 
sure that subordinate attorneys, interns, paralegals, case managers, 
administrative assistants, and external business partners all 
understand necessary data security practices and the critical role that 
all parties play in ensuring the protection of client information.105
In addition, these changes make modest positive 
contributions to lawyers’ understanding of new technological 
realities. For example, the title of Rule 5.3 was changed from 
97 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 95-398 (1995). 
98 Id.; see also N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. #2012-13/4 (2013), 
https://www.nhbar.org/legal-links/Ethics-Opinion-2012-13_04.asp (“Where highly sensitive 
data is involved, it may become necessary to inform the client of the lawyer's use of cloud 
computing and to obtain the client's informed consent.”); Pa. Bar Assoc., Comm. on Legal 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2011-200 (2011), http://www.slaw.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/2011-200-Cloud-Computing.pdf [http://perma.cc/GJ87-T8TS] (“While 
it is not necessary to communicate every minute detail of a client’s representation, ‘adequate 
information’ should be provided to the client so that the client understands the nature of 
the representation and ‘material risks’ inherent in an attorney’s methods.”). 
99 See also Alaska Rule 5.3(d) (2014), dictating that “[a] lawyer who learns that any 
person employed by the lawyer has revealed a confidence . . . protected by these rules shall 
notify the person whose confidence or secret was revealed.” Importantly, however, the 
rule does not generally apply to a law firm experiencing a cyberattack and compromised 
information but rather only to a third party employed by the law firm. 
100 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(a); see also Goldberg, supra note 25, at 
529–30; Hughes, supra note 26, at 415–16.
101 Christine Daleiden, Information Security Basics for Lawyers, 18 HAW. B.J. 4, 8–9 
(2014).
102 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1.
103 Id.
104 Id. r. 5.3.
105 Simshaw, supra note 5, at 563. 
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“Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants,” to 
“Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance,” to capture 
the notion that technology, including cybertechnology, assists 
lawyers in the practice of law. Rule 5.3, providing examples of the 
use of non-lawyers outside the firm, offers “using an Internet-based 
service to store client information” as an illustration.106
Yet, Rules 5.1 and 5.3, once again, forgo an opportunity to 
take a clear detailed stance regarding cybersecurity efforts and 
measures. For example, Comment 2 on Rule 5.1 states that 
“[p]aragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority 
within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal 
policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance 
that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Rules,”107 and 
goes on to give examples of such “internal policies and 
procedures,” a perfect opportunity to require cybersecurity 
measures, including the adoption of cybersecurity plans. Instead, 
it states “[s]uch policies and procedures include those designed to 
detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which 
actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client 
funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are 
properly supervised.”108
Similarly, while Comment 3 on Rule 5.3 identifies lawyers’ 
use of cloud computing as a form of non-lawyer assistance, it fails 
to detail any of the efforts and measures lawyers must employ in 
conjunction with the use of this technology. Instead, it 
generically states that: “[w]hen using such services outside the 
firm, a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
services are provided in a manner that is compatible with the 
lawyer’s professional obligations,” adding that “[t]he extent of 
this obligation will depend upon the circumstances, including the 
education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; the 
nature of the services involved; [and] the terms of any 
arrangements concerning the protection of client information.”109
In other words, the Rules once again invoke reasonableness 
without specifying its content and a commitment to protecting 
confidentiality without specific guidance as to the cybersecurity 
measures lawyers must put in place.  
Lawyers’ use of cloud computing has been the subject of 
various ethics opinions that serve as a revealing example of how 
106 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 cmt. 3.
107 Id. r. 5.1 cmt. 2. 
108 Id. Arguably, given Rule 1.15’s requirement that lawyers protect clients’ property, 
including clients’ trust accounts, Comment 2 could be read to demand cybersecurity 
measures to protect such accounts, but this would be at best an implied requirement. 
109 Id. r. 5.3 cmt. 3. 
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ethics committees follow the lead of the Rules and offer only a 
limited insight into the meaning of reasonableness. Ethics 
opinions generally hold that cloud computing is permissible, as 
long as lawyers take reasonable steps when selecting and using 
services.110 Notably, some states appear to impose additional, 
specific cybersecurity measures (Iowa requires lawyers to 
“[d]etermine the degree of protection the vendor provides to its 
clients’ data”; New Jersey requires lawyers to “[m]ake sure that 
vendors are using available technology to guard against 
foreseeable infiltration attempts”; and North Carolina demands 
that its lawyers “[e]valuate the vendor’s security and backup 
strategy”), and The ABA Cybersecurity Handbook wisely 
acknowledges that “[l]awyers should monitor and reassess the 
protections of the cloud provider as the technology evolves.”111
How lawyers are to go about meeting these requirements, 
however, is less than clear. As Drew Simshaw points out, “[i]t is 
also worth noting the limits of a lawyer’s duties under the 
rules,”112 according to these ethics opinions. For example, in New 
Hampshire, “a lawyer’s duty is to take reasonable steps to protect 
confidential client information, not to become an expert in 
information technology,” and “[w]hen it comes to the use of cloud 
computing, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not impose a 
strict liability standard.”113
All in all, the ABA must be commended for its proactive 
approach to addressing the evolving impact of technology on law 
practice. New subsection 1.6(c) explicitly identifies protection of 
client information, including cybersecurity measures, as a 
priority, and moving the language from a Comment to the body of 
the Rules signifies to lawyers the emphasis the Rules now place 
on information protection.114 Next, the new subsection takes a 
first important step in shifting lawyers’ focus from avoiding 
110 Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts_fyis/cloudethics
-chart.html [http://perma.cc/VY84-VA7P]. In addition, The ABA Cybersecurity Handbook 
contains an appendix of “Ethics Opinions on Lawyer Confidentiality Obligations 
Concerning Cloud Computing.” RHODES & POLLEY, supra note 4, at 245. 
111 Id. at 77. 
112 Simshaw, supra note 5, at 565. 
113 N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. #2012-13/4 (2013), supra note 98. 
114 For an excellent analysis of the Rules’ new approach to cybersecurity, see 
generally Judith L. Maute, Facing 21st Century Realities, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 345 (2013).
The ABA has tried to stay at the forefront of enhancing lawyers’ cybersecurity awareness. 
For example, in April 2016, ABA President Paulette Brown offered ABA members an 
opportunity to receive FBI cybersecurity alerts, noting that, “the ABA is keenly aware of 
the increase in efforts to hack into the computer systems of legal professionals to reach 
the significant amounts of non-public information they hold.” See E-mail from Paulette 
Brown, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to ABA Members (Apr. 12, 2016, 2:00 AM) (on file with 
author).
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negligent and inadvertent disclosure to the new landscape of 
affirmatively protecting client information from unauthorized 
access by third parties. Moreover, Comments 18 and 19 to Rule 
1.6 help clarify the meaning of the duty to protect client 
information by specifying the factors that render protective 
measures reasonable. Appropriate references to this new 
approach are made in Rules 1.1, 1.15, 5.1, and 5.3. Yet the Rules 
do not do enough to guide lawyers’ cybersecurity conduct, 
especially given that liability rules and market controls are not 
likely to incentivize lawyers to sufficiently protect client 
information. 
B. Responding to the New Frontier: The Future of Legal Ethics 
in the Age of Hackers and Cyberthreats to Clients’ Information  
The Rules embody, and have long taken, a one-size-fits-all, 
universal approach to the regulation of lawyers’ conduct.115 As 
such, they cannot, and should not, be amended frequently to 
reflect minor changes in the practice of law. Rather, the Rules 
are open-ended standards that can and should accommodate 
practice changes, for example via clarifying formal ethics 
opinions. However, sometimes changing practice realities do 
necessitate revisions to the Rules, and in such circumstances the 
Rules must be revised so they can continue to inform and guide 
lawyers’ actual practice and avoid becoming antiquated.116
Cybersecurity is one such instance that necessitates 
changing the Rules. Protecting confidential client information, a 
fundamental tenet of law practice, used to be about avoiding 
negligent inadvertent disclosure. Typical examples of misconduct 
were leaving one’s notes or laptop unattended in a conference 
room, or inadvertently disclosing confidential information to 
opposing counsel over e-mail.117 Hackers, however, present a 
different challenge, one of affirmatively protecting information 
from unauthorized preying parties, often engaged in criminal 
activity. Technological advances commonly utilized in the 
practice of law, and the risks to unauthorized disclosure of client 
information they entail, thus require a regulatory shift in the 
Rules, from avoiding inadvertent disclosure to acknowledging a 
positive duty to protect confidential information. Put differently, 
the unique challenge cybersecurity concerns present is not 
merely coming to terms with technological advancements, which 
115 Wald, supra note 9, at 228. 
116 Id.
117 Silkenat, supra note 2, at 450; see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
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the profession, while reluctant, has done in the past.118 Rather, it 
is shifting from a passive regime of avoiding negligent disclosure 
to an active regime of affirmatively protecting information 
against parties, some of which engage in criminal activity.  
To be clear, the emergence of lawyers’ affirmative duty to 
reasonably protect client information from unauthorized 
disclosure is not a move toward strict liability. Fully protecting 
client information from all cyberattacks is not feasible given 
current available technologies, and even if complete protection 
was possible, it might so undercut the use of effective technology 
and be so cost prohibitive as to render it unreasonable. 
Furthermore, utilizing technology to better serve the needs of 
clients, and confronting the risks inherent in the use of technology, 
is and ought to be a joint attorney-client undertaking. As clients 
reap the benefits of new technologies and are sometimes better 
positioned as compared to their lawyers to address their risks, 
there is no reason to impose strict liability on lawyers for the use 
of technology in the practice of law. Accordingly, lawyers need 
only take reasonable steps to protect client information. Yet, the 
Rules’ approach to cybersecurity must recognize and effectuate 
an affirmative duty to reasonably protect clients’ information and 
develop a helpful definition of reasonableness that encompasses 
an obligation to protect client information from criminal activity. 
The Rules must clarify that a lawyer not only needs to avoid 
negligently leaving notes in plain view, but must also protect 
against theft of one’s virtual briefcase. 
1. Mandating the Adoption of Appropriate Cybersecurity 
Plans for All Clients 
Lawyers’ cybersecurity conduct is underregulated, which 
likely results in insufficient action to protect client information. 
Because liability rules and market controls are unlikely to 
effectively incentivize lawyers to take reasonable action, the 
Rules must require that lawyers adopt appropriate cybersecurity 
plans. Revealingly, the ABA’s Resolution 109 “encourages all 
private and public sector organizations to develop, implement, 
and maintain an appropriate cybersecurity program that 
complies with applicable ethical and legal obligations and is 
tailored to the nature and scope of the organization and the data 
and systems to be protected.”119 Yet nothing in the Rules imposes 
a duty on lawyers to develop cybersecurity programs for all 
clients.  
118 Toohey, supra note 65. 
119 ABA CYBERSECURITY RESOLUTION, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
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To be sure, Comment 18 on Rule 1.6 does state that: “[p]aragraph 
(c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information
relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized 
access by third parties,” and adds that: “[t]he unauthorized 
access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, 
information relating to the representation of a client does not 
constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made 
reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure,”120 arguably 
indirectly encouraging lawyers to put in place a cybersecurity 
plan for all clients. After all, “acting competently” and making 
“reasonable efforts” would seem to require at least implementing 
a cybersecurity plan. Yet the Rules do not affirmatively require 
the adoption of such a plan and would appear to tolerate an 
interpretation that at least in some circumstances the prongs of 
“acting competently” and making “reasonable efforts” could be 
satisfied without the implementation of a cybersecurity plan. 
Indeed, Comment 18 does not specify what constitutes “acting 
competently” nor “reasonable efforts.”121
The Rules ought to require that all lawyers maintain an 
appropriate cybersecurity plan, akin to Comment 3 on Rule 1.7, 
which mandates the adoption of reasonable conflict-checking 
procedures.122 Accordingly, a new Comment X to Rule 1.6 should 
read:
[t]o competently safeguard information relating to the representation 
of a client against unauthorized access by third parties, a lawyer must 
adopt reasonable procedures, including reasonable cybersecurity 
measures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to 
protect a client’s confidential information. Ignorance caused by a 
failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer’s violation 
of this Rule.123
120 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 18. 
121 See Ezekiel, supra note 13, at 658–59 (“These rules generally require the law firms 
to take ‘reasonable efforts,’ ‘reasonable steps,’ or ‘reasonable precautions’ to avoid 
unauthorized disclosure, but are unspecific about what such precautions might entail. 
One rule demands that the precautions taken must “meet[] industry standards,” but is 
unfortunately vague about whether it refers to the standards of the legal industry or 
those of the Internet data storage industry.”) (internal citations omitted). 
122 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 3. 
123 The Comment to Rule 1.6 includes two sections, Comments 18 and 19, under the 
subheadings of “Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality.” See id. The proposed 
Comment can be added as Comment 18, renumbering current Comments 18 and 19 as 19 
and 20 respectively; or as Comment 20 (renumbering current Comment 20 regarding 
confidentiality duties owed to former clients as Comment 21). Or the proposed Comment 
can be added to the existing Comment. For a redline of the proposed revisions to the 
Rules, see Appendix A.  
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2. Defining “Reasonable Efforts”: Reasonable Cybersecurity 
Measures  
Just as Comment 3 on Rule 1.7 has resulted in virtually all 
law firms employing a conflict-checking software as the first step 
in detecting conflicts of interest, proposed new Comment X to 
Rule 1.6 should result in all law firms adopting basic 
cybersecurity measures, such as employing current virus 
scanners and firewalls, installing patches and updates, and using 
cryptographically strong passwords, reasonably replaced from 
time to time,124 as the first step in implementing a 
comprehensive cybersecurity plan. Yet the adoption of basic 
cybersecurity measures should not be left to chance. Instead, 
adoption of such basic security measures must be explicitly 
recognized as a professional requirement for any attorney who 
stores sensitive client data on an Internet-connected computer.125
For example, law firms must be expected to demonstrate their 
system’s ability to detect and repel a cyberattack.126
Thus, to begin with, “reasonable efforts” must include basic 
cybersecurity measures such as “robust strategies for identifying, 
prioritizing, and securing . . . valuable information,”127 periodical 
inspection of the firm’s operating and information storage 
systems for signs of cyberattacks and data theft, the use of 
current virus scanners and firewalls, installing patches and 
updates, using cryptographically strong passwords, avoiding 
risky software downloads from the Internet, eschewing the use of 
public cloud providers or file sharing services for sharing 
documents, avoiding the use of web-based e-mail services and 
public Wi-Fi, replacing the default passwords on network 
hardware, and the adoption of training protocol for firm lawyers 
and staff, appropriate for the size and practice of the firm, for 
example, to recognize phishing attacks.128
A new Comment Y to Rule 1.6 should read: 
[r]easonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized 
disclosure of electronically stored information relating to the 
representation of a client would normally include robust strategies for 
identifying, prioritizing, and securing valuable information; periodical 
inspection of the firm’s information storage system for signs of 
cyberattacks and data theft; the use of basic cybersecurity measures, 
including the use of current virus scanners and firewalls, installing 
patches and updates, using cryptographically strong passwords 
124 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
125 See Ezekiel, supra note 13, at 665.
126 Silkenat, supra note 2, at 455. 
127 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1250. 
128 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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updated from time to time, avoiding risky software downloads from 
the Internet, eschewing the use of public cloud providers or file 
sharing services for sharing documents; and the adoption of 
cybersecurity training protocols for firm lawyers and staff. See Rule 
5.1 and 5.3.129
An attempt to identify basic cybersecurity measures in the 
Comment entails two related risks. A closed-list of measures 
may, over time, be treated as a “check-a-box” procedure for 
purposes of avoiding discipline, or understood to constitute a safe 
harbor—in the sense that lawyers who employ these basic 
cybersecurity measures may never be found to have failed to 
make “reasonable efforts” to protect their clients’ information. To 
avoid such misapprehension, the Comment should explain that 
basic cybersecurity measures form but a floor for appropriate cyber 
conduct, necessary but often insufficient means of satisfying the 
requirement of “reasonable efforts.” Far from constituting a safe 
harbor, basic measures simply set up a default foundation for 
“reasonable efforts,” which depend on a variety of factors already 
identified by the Comment. Moreover, the Comment should 
explicitly state that some circumstances may require the adoption 
of additional special cybersecurity measures. 
Comment Z to Rule 1.6 may accordingly add that: 
[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take additional special security 
measures to safeguard a client’s information, above and beyond basic 
cybersecurity measures, depends on the circumstances. For example, 
a lawyer may be required to take special security measures to protect 
sensitive information related to the representation of a client.130
Relatedly, technological advances may, over time, render 
proposed Comment Y obsolete, a concern compounded by the 
traditional delay involved in adoption of revisions to the Rules, 
first at the ABA level and subsequently by states to their 
respective rules of professional conduct. Indeed, one commentator 
concludes that given the long delay inherent in Rules revisions, 
the “ABA and state bar associations have demonstrated that they 
might not be the best sources of reform in this subject 
[cybersecurity].”131 Yet one should not overstate the rate of 
relevant technological advances, indeed, many of the currently 
available basic cybersecurity measures, admittedly in more 
129 See infra Appendix A for a redline of the proposed revisions to the Rules. Rules 5.1 
and 5.3 ought to be amended respectively to reference proposed Comment Y to Rule 1.6. 
130 Id.
131 Travis Andrews, Technological Innovation, The Legal Profession and the Need for 
Uniform Law, CHARLOTTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2684950.
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primitive forms, have been available for a few decades now. In 
any event, lamentable delays in promulgation and revision 
notwithstanding, the Rules remain the only practical and, therefore, 
most operative means of correcting for the underregulation of 
lawyers’ cybersecurity conduct, given the ineffectiveness of 
liability rules and market controls and the distant probability of 
national cybersecurity legislation, let alone one that would apply 
to lawyers. If at all, a years-long delay in the promulgation of the 
Rules and their adoption by the states does not constitute a 
compelling reason to avoid regulation. Quite the contrary, the 
delay ought to be addressed by reforming the historical process of 
promulgation and adoption to ensure that the Rules remain 
relevant and helpful to lawyers. There is no denying that old 
political habits die hard, especially at the hands of the ABA 
House of Delegates and state supreme courts’ advisory committees. 
Yet, failure by the legal profession to effectively regulate itself 
may result, and in fact has resulted, in increased federal and 
state legislation undermining the profession’s privilege of self-
regulation.132
Nor would an ABA Formal Opinion be an adequate 
substitute to proposed Comment Y to Rule 1.6. Ethics opinions, 
while relatively easier and faster to publish and withdraw, if 
rendered obsolete, have no binding authority and are therefore 
inferior to Rules’ revisions.133 Moreover, given the underregulation 
of lawyer’s cybersecurity conduct, ethics opinions will simply not 
do. The Rules must be revised to send lawyers a credible 
message, both substantively and symbolically, about the importance 
of acting affirmatively to protect clients’ information. If 
technology ends up rendering proposed Comment Y obsolete, it 
can be revised in accordance with evolving cybersecurity 
knowledge and expertise. 
132 See Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The 
Federalization of Legal Ethics, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2011) (documenting the 
federalization of legal ethics); Bruce A. Green, ABA Ethics Reform from “MDP” to “20/20”: Some 
Cautionary Reflections, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 4–7 (2009) (arguing that future reform to 
the regulation of lawyers may require abandoning the state-based approach); Eli Wald, 
Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice and the Future of the American 
Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489 (2011); Fred C. Zacharias, 
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994); see also Ted Schneyer, Professional
Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (1991) (predicting the 
adoption of a “Federal Code of Lawyering”). Of course, states may act independent of the 
ongoing federalization of legal ethics and regulate the practice of law within their 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6000 (West 2016). 
133 See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective 
Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 317–19 (2002).
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3. “Reasonable Efforts” Further Construed  
To further clarify that basic cybersecurity measures merely 
define a floor rather than a ceiling for “reasonable efforts,” the 
Comment to Rule 1.6 must spell out the meaning of “reasonable 
efforts” beyond such basic steps. Comment 18 already helps 
construe “reasonable efforts,” stating in relevant part: 
[f]actors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the 
lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the 
information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are 
not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the 
difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the 
safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients 
(e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively 
difficult to use).134
Comment 19 adds that: 
[w]hen transmitting a communication that includes information 
relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take 
reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into 
the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not 
require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of 
communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special 
circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s 
expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information 
and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected 
by law or by a confidentiality agreement.135
The Comment, however, does not define the term “special 
security measures,” except indirectly by using language similar 
to the one used in ABA Formal Opinion 99-413 on encryption of 
confidential information.136 Instead, the Comment can provide 
examples of “special security measures,” such as the use of 
encryption to protect sensitive client information and 
attorney-client communications.137
Next, the Comment may explicitly state that a lawyer who 
fails to take the most basic security precautions violates Rule 
1.6(c), even if the client’s information was accessed by a third 
party criminally. In other words, the Comment should state that 
the criminal conduct of third parties does not constitute a safe 
harbor to lawyers who fail to make “reasonable efforts” to protect 
the information. Historically, the Rules made attorneys liable for 
their own conduct, for example, inadvertently disclosing 
134 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
135 Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 19 (emphasis added). 
136 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 84. 
137 See proposed Comment U, Appendix A. 
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confidential client information, but not for the criminal actions of 
third parties. “This view,” explains Alan Ezekiel, “that attorneys 
are not responsible for violations of client privacy that flow from 
criminal misconduct by third parties may have been informed by 
the evolution of legal standards regarding the use of mobile 
phones.”138 Whereas early ethics opinions in the 1990s suggested 
that attorneys might violate rules of professional conduct by 
discussing private client information on mobile phones because 
outsiders could overhear the conversations, later opinions 
reflected the view that “the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (which criminalized interception of wireless telephone 
conversations) created a reasonable expectation of privacy on a 
mobile phone, and thus the attorney could discuss client matters 
on a mobile phone without violating any ethical standards.”139
Importantly, “[t]he fact that an outsider might be able to 
overhear the conversation was irrelevant,” adds Ezekiel, 
“because the outsider would thereby be committing a felony.”140
Similarly, because “[a] hacker would be committing a 
felonious violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by 
accessing client records without authorization,”141 Comment 19’s 
statement that the duty to protect client information “does not 
require that the lawyer use special security measures if the 
method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of 
privacy”142 can be read to suggest that an attorney who fails to 
prevent unauthorized criminal access to client information is not 
acting unreasonably. “But,” asked Ezekiel compellingly, “should 
the fact that hacking is illegal excuse an attorney who fails to 
take even the most basic security precautions in an era of 
widespread data theft?”143
Of course, that a third party commits a crime to access client 
information is relevant in terms of determining the consequences 
for the client. For example, because the attorney-client privilege 
belongs to the client, only the behavior of the client—holder of 
the privilege—or the client’s lawyer-agent can waive it. 
Therefore, in most jurisdictions, intercepted communications are 
still privileged, meaning that client information stolen from the 
lawyer would nonetheless continue to be privileged.144 Such 
attempts to mitigate the consequences of information theft for 
138 Ezekiel, supra note 13, at 659.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 659–60. 
141 Id.
142 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
143 Ezekiel, supra note 13, at 660.
144 Hughes, supra note 26, at 417–18.
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victim-clients ought not, however, negate the misconduct of an 
attorney who fails to utilize basic cybersecurity measures to 
protect client information.  
Thus, in addition to offering examples of “special security 
measures” and the circumstances which warrant them, the 
Comment to Rule 1.6 must clearly state that a third party’s 
criminal activity accessing clients’ information does not negate 
the responsibility of a lawyer who fails to take reasonable 
cybersecurity measures on behalf of clients. Comment V to Rule 
1.6 may accordingly add that: 
[t]he unauthorized access to information relating to the representation 
of a client does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer 
has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure. 
However, an unauthorized access to information relating to the 
representation of a client may constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if 
the lawyer has not made reasonable efforts to prevent the access, even 
if a third party accessed the information unlawfully.145
4. Disclosure of Cyberattacks and Data Theft to Clients 
The Rules do not impose a general duty on lawyers to advise 
clients when their information has been compromised in a 
cyberattack, let alone that the law firm was or is under attack.146
Rule 1.4(a)(3) only requires lawyers to “keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter,” which 
Comment 3 explains means advising clients regarding “significant 
developments affecting the . . . substance of the representation.”147
Yet, as we have seen, because often the identity of the attacker, 
the nature of the information compromised, and the extent of the 
damage to the client are unknown, a lawyer may not be in a 
position to conclude that the cyberattack or data theft constitute 
“a significant development” as opposed to a mere development, 
and so Rule 1.4(a)(3) is not triggered. Similarly, the inherent 
uncertainty often surrounding cyberattacks means that Rule 
1.4(b)’s admonition for lawyers to “explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation”148 may not be triggered 
because the impact on the matter at hand may be less than clear 
to the lawyer. 
145 For a redline of the proposed revisions to the Rules, see Appendix A. 
146 See supra Section III.A. 
147 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(3). 
148 Id. r. 1.4(b).
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This prevailing interpretation of Rule 1.4 finds some support in 
the recent rule amendments regarding cybersecurity. Comment 18 
on Rule 1.6 states in relevant part that:  
[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to 
safeguard a client’s information in order to comply with other law, 
such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose 
notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, 
electronic information, is beyond the scope of these Rules.149
Read narrowly, the Comment merely states the obvious, namely, 
that the Rules never, and do not in the case of cybersecurity, 
purport to construe “other law” such as state and federal laws 
that may or may not impose additional duties on lawyers. Yet the 
Comment may also imply or may be read by some lawyers to 
suggest that notification requirements to clients upon the loss or 
unauthorized access to their information are beyond the scope of 
the Rules. 
The better interpretation of Rule 1.4, however, is that it does 
impose an affirmative duty on lawyers to notify clients when 
their confidential information has been compromised, even when 
the consequences and impact of the attacks on clients’ 
information fall short of the “significant development” threshold 
of Rule 1.4(a)(3) or the duty to explain a matter and the means by 
which it is to be pursued to a client per 1.4(b). To see why 
imposing a disclosure duty is warranted, recall that Rule 
1.4(a)(3), as construed by Comment 3, does impose a duty on 
lawyers to advise clients regarding a significant development 
affecting the representation. The Rule assumes that in most 
circumstance a lawyer would be able to determine whether a 
particular development is either significant (and therefore 
triggers 1.4(a)(3)) or less than significant (such that 1.4(a)(3) is 
not triggered). Cyberattacks, however, are an example of a 
circumstance possibly not anticipated by the Rules—one in which 
inherent uncertainty prevents a lawyer from reasonably 
concluding whether a development affecting the matter is 
significant or not. In such a case, lawyers as agents and 
fiduciaries of clients must err on the side of caution and advise 
their principals-clients of the development.150 That is, in the face 
149 Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 18 (emphasis added).
150 Elsewhere, I argue that Rule 1.4 should be revised and/or interpreted to mean 
that lawyers must advise clients regarding all material developments regarding the 
representation. See Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore 
Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 789–91 (2008). Inherent uncertainty regarding 
cyberattacks may leave lawyers unable to determine whether an attack constitutes a 
material development affecting the representation. Taking attorney-client communications, 
and therefore clients, seriously dictates that when faced with such inherent uncertainty, 
lawyers must err on the side of disclosing more rather than less information relating to 
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 98 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 98 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 4/23/16 10:41 AM 
536 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:2
of inherent uncertainty regarding the impact of cyberattacks and 
whether client information has been compromised, a question 
arises as to whether clients should know more or less about the 
development. Because clients are the principals in the 
attorney-client relationship and lawyers are mere 
agents-fiduciaries, it appears that in the face of inherent 
uncertainty, lawyers must err on the side of more, rather than 
less, disclosure to clients. This interpretation is especially 
compelling in the context of cyberattacks, in which clients, as 
opposed to lawyers, would often be in the best position to assess 
the impact of and respond to cyberattacks.151
Acknowledging that in general, lawyers must tell clients 
more about compromised client information requires detailing 
when lawyers must communicate with clients—identifying the 
specific triggering event for disclosure—and how they ought to go 
about discussing cyberattacks and their consequences with 
clients. In this regard, the Rules may learn from existing states’ 
personal information data breach notification statutes.152 For 
example, California Civil Code section 1798.82(a) states that: 
(a) A person or business . . . that owns or licenses computerized data 
that includes personal information, shall disclose a breach of the 
security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach 
in the security of the data to a [person] whose unencrypted personal 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by 
an unauthorized person. The disclosure shall be made in the most 
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay . . . .153
California’s statutory notification provision is noteworthy in 
at least two ways. First, while it imposes a mandatory duty to 
notify customers,154 the duty is triggered only when the protected 
information was or is reasonably believed to have been 
compromised.155 The provision, to be clear, does not impose a 
notification duty when a cybersecurity system storing protected 
information is under a cyberattack, presumably because such a 
trigger would reveal little to customers if the system was able to 
thwart the attack. Rather, notification is mandated either when 
protected information was compromised, or, in the face of some 
uncertainty, when it is reasonable to assume that the protected 
information has been compromised. Second, the statute only 
requires notification when a person’s “unencrypted personal 
the representation to clients. Id. at 748–50. 
151 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 540–41.
152 McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 12, at 1254–56. 
153 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2016). 
154 Id. (“shall disclose a breach of the security of the system”).
155 Id. (“whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to 
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person”).
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information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired 
by an unauthorized person.”156 That is, because the statute only 
requires notification when unencrypted information was or is 
reasonably believed to have been compromised, arguably 
encryption of the information provides a practical safe harbor 
and negates the need to disclose a breach. 
The statutory experience thus suggests two models the Rules 
can follow. Akin to California’s notification apparatus, a modest 
revision to the Rules can require disclosure to clients only when a 
client’s confidential information has been or is reasonably 
believed to have been compromised, and only if the confidential 
information was not reasonably protected, such that if a lawyer 
reasonably protects the information (via encryption or otherwise) 
no disclosure to clients would be mandated. For example, the 
Rules may be amended to state that: 
A lawyer who stores (or employs a third party provider to store) 
information related to the representation of a client, shall disclose a 
breach of the security of the system following discovery or notification 
of the breach in the security of the data to a client, whose 
unreasonably protected confidential information was, or is reasonably 
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The 
disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay. 
Such a disclosure provision would naturally follow and 
complement the above proposals requiring all lawyers to adopt 
cybersecurity plans for all their clients and to make reasonable 
efforts to protect clients’ confidential information. Lawyers who 
take these two steps would, practically speaking, have no duty to 
report to clients when their information has been or is reasonably 
believed to have been compromised because they would be 
covered by a safe harbor of reasonableness. 
In the alternative, the Rules may adopt the triggering event 
of the personal information notification statutes—information that 
was or is reasonably believed to have been compromised—without 
excusing disclosure to clients even when the lawyer did make 
reasonable efforts to protect the information. Comment W to Rule 
1.4 should read: 
A lawyer who stores (or employs a third party provider to store) 
information related to the representation of a client, shall disclose a 
breach of the security of the system following discovery or notification 
of the breach in the security of the data to a client, whose confidential 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by 
156 Id. (emphasis added). 
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an unauthorized person. The disclosure shall be made in the most 
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay.157
The latter approach appears to be warranted in the context 
of the attorney-client relationship. When a client’s confidential 
information was or is reasonably believed to have been 
compromised, clients must be advised, even if the lawyer did 
make reasonable efforts to protect the information. One might 
argue that when a lawyer has made reasonable efforts to protect 
the information, imposing a mandatory duty on lawyers to advise 
clients that their information was, or is, reasonably believed to 
have been compromised is likely to be ineffective—burdening the 
client with irrelevant information, with possible distinct adverse 
consequences, such as chilling or eroding the attorney-client 
relationship. Put differently, would not mandating adoption of 
cybersecurity plans and spelling out reasonable efforts be 
enough? If these provisions end up ensuring reasonable conduct 
by lawyers, why force disclosure and risk clients developing 
“notice fatigue”? Would not clients be content with lawyers’ 
adoption of reasonable efforts? If nothing else could have been 
reasonably done by lawyers, why tire the clients with additional 
disclosures?
These objections, however, must be rejected for three related 
reasons. First, they smack of lawyers’ self-interest at the expense 
of clients, the very concern about and criticism of the Rules to 
which lawyers ought to be sensitive.158 No doubt, reporting to a 
client that the client’s confidential information was or is 
reasonably believed to have been compromised is likely to be 
awkward to the lawyer,159 but that is not in and of itself a 
legitimate ground a lawyer should be able to invoke to avoid 
disclosing information to the client. 
Second, recall that this Article advocates a revision to the 
Comment to Rule 1.6, pursuant to which “a lawyer must adopt 
reasonable procedures . . . appropriate for the size and type of 
firm and practice, to protect a client’s information,” including 
reasonable cybersecurity procedures.160 With such a cybersecurity 
plan in place, a lawyer’s communication to a client regarding a 
breach and compromised information following a cyberattack is 
157 For a redline of the proposed revisions to the Rules, see Appendix A, proposed 
Comment W to Rule 1.4. 
158 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
159 Recall that if a cyberattack has in fact resulted in disclosure of a client’s material 
confidential information, then even a traditional reading of 1.4(a)(3) and 1.4(b) will 
mandate disclosure to the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
160 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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unlikely to chill the attorney-client relationship, because a 
lawyer would be able to cheaply and effectively explain to the 
client the reasonable efforts the law firm made to protect the 
client’s information, and the inherent uncertainty surrounding 
the cyberattack, notwithstanding the reasonable security measures 
undertaken. Indeed, it is the current state of technology that 
prevents lawyers (and others) from stopping all cyberattacks and 
reasonable clients should be able to understand and accept a 
lawyer’s reasonable conduct in the face of technological 
limitations and uncertainty.  
Finally, any interpretation second-guessing disclosing 
information to clients when confidential information was or is 
reasonably believed to have been compromised on the ground 
that clients may not understand it or will be fatigued smacks of 
lawyers’ paternalism vis-à-vis clients, inappropriate in the 
attorney-client relationship.161 As I explain elsewhere, “for lawyers 
to assume that clients are unable to comprehend and appreciate the 
consequences and meaning of complex . . . information, even 
when offered a detailed explanation . . . would constitute 
unacceptable paternalistic withholding of material information.”162
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its landmark decision, Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson,163 construed the term “material” in securities law. It 
held that to address inherent uncertainty by not disclosing material 
information to clients amounts to assuming that clients are 
nitwits, unable to appreciate—even when told—that [cybersecurity 
measures] are risky propositions . . . . Disclosure, and not paternalistic 
withholding of accurate information, is the [desirable] policy . . . . The 
role of the materiality requirement is not to ‘attribute to [clients] a 
child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic significance 
of [cybersecurity measures]’ . . . but to filter out essentially useless 
information that a reasonable [client] would not consider significant, 
even as part of a larger ‘mix’ of factors to consider in making his . . . 
decision164
regarding the attorney-client relationship. 
Moreover, fatigue assumes that clients would know and may 
not care or become indifferent about security breaches. Yet the 
assumption seems inapplicable here. Currently, clients do not 
usually learn about, and are unlikely to be indifferent about 
breaches regarding their confidential information. For the same 
reason, mandating disclosure to clients only when the 
unauthorized access of confidential information is likely to have a 
161 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).
162 Wald, supra note 150, at 795. 
163 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
164 Id. at 234; see also Wald, supra note 150, at 795–96. 
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prejudicial impact on their representation would not suffice. Just 
as the inherent uncertainty surrounding cyberattacks often 
precludes lawyers from concluding that a breach of confidential 
information constitutes a “significant development” mandating 
disclosure to clients, the same uncertainty will likely prevent 
lawyers from concluding that a breach has a prejudicial impact 
on clients’ representation. Because a reasonable client would like 
to know when her confidential information was, or is, reasonably 
believed to have been accessed by an unauthorized party, a 
lawyer must disclose accordingly.  
Mandating disclosure to clients when confidential 
information was, or is, reasonably believed to have been 
compromised has one additional important benefit. Disclosure 
would, in turn, enable clients to sanction lawyers who fail to put 
in place “reasonable efforts” to protect their confidential 
information and reward lawyers who do make reasonable efforts 
to protect confidential information. Put differently, the adoption 
of a rule of professional conduct mandating disclosure of 
cybersecurity information to clients would allow clients to 
exercise market controls over lawyers, further addressing the 
underregulation of lawyers’ cybersecurity conduct. Finally, even 
if lawyers do make reasonable efforts to protect confidential 
information, a disclosure duty would result in more conversations 
with clients about cybersecurity, allowing clients to participate 
on an informed basis regarding the cyber means by which their 
objectives are to be pursued.  
CONCLUSION
The inherent uncertainty often surrounding cyberattacks on 
law firms—who specifically perpetrated the attack, what 
information was stolen or compromised, and what damage, if 
any, did a client suffer as a result of the attack—renders liability 
rules, such as malpractice suits, and market controls, such as 
being fired by a client, ineffective in regulating lawyers’ 
cybersecurity conduct. The Rules thus have an opportunity to 
play a meaningful role in informing and guiding the conduct of 
underregulated lawyers, by requiring lawyers to adopt and 
implement cybersecurity plans for all clients, defining the 
meaning of “reasonable efforts” necessary to prevent the 
unauthorized disclosure or access to information relating to the 
representation of a client, and by mandating disclosure to clients 
when their confidential information was, or is, reasonably 
believed to have been accessed by an unauthorized party. 
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Appendix A: Proposed Revisions to the Rules 
Proposed revisions to the Rules are italicized. 
Comment on Rule 1.6
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality
[18] Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to 
safeguard information relating to the representation of a client 
against unauthorized access by third parties and against 
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other 
persons who are participating in the representation of the client 
or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 
and 5.3.  
[X] To competently safeguard information relating to the 
representation of a client against unauthorized access by third 
parties, a lawyer must adopt reasonable procedures, including 
reasonable cybersecurity measures, appropriate for the size and 
type of firm and practice, to protect a client’s confidential 
information. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such 
procedures will not excuse a lawyer’s violation of this Rule.
The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, information relating to the 
representation of a client does not constitute a violation of 
paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to 
prevent the access or disclosure. 
[Y] Reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of information relating to the 
representation of a client would normally include robust 
strategies for identifying, prioritizing, and securing valuable 
information; periodical inspection of the firm’s information 
storage system for signs of cyberattacks and data theft; the use of 
basic cybersecurity measures, including the use of current virus 
scanners and firewalls, installing patches and updates, using 
cryptographically strong passwords updated from time to time, 
avoiding risky software downloads from the Internet, eschewing 
the use of public cloud providers or file sharing services for 
sharing documents; and the adoption of cybersecurity training 
protocols for firm lawyers and staff. See Rule 5.1 and 5.3.
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness 
of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the 
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if 
additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing 
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 101 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 101 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 4/23/16 10:41 AM 
542 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:2
additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the 
safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely 
affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a 
device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).
[Z] Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional 
special security measures to safeguard a client’s information, 
above and beyond basic cybersecurity measures, depends on the 
circumstances. For example, a lawyer may be required to take 
special security measures to protect sensitive information related 
to the representation of a client.
A client may require the lawyer to implement special 
security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed 
consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be 
required by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take 
additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order to 
comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that 
govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements 
upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic 
information, is beyond the scope of these Rules, but see Rule 1.4, 
Comment [U]. For a lawyer’s duties when sharing information 
with nonlawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm, see Rule 5.3, 
Comments [3]-[4].  
[19] When transmitting a communication that includes 
information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer 
must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information 
from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, 
however, does not require that the lawyer use special security 
measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
[U] Special security measures may include encryption of 
attorney-client communications or password-protecting 
information relating to the representation of a client on the 
lawyer’s or law firm’s information storage system.
Special circumstances, however, may warrant special 
precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of confidentiality 
include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which 
the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a 
confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to 
implement special security measures not required by this Rule or 
may give informed consent to the use of a means of 
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule. 
Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in 
order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws 
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that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules, but
see Rule 1.4, Comment [3].
[V] The unauthorized access to information relating to the 
representation of a client does not constitute a violation of 
paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent 
the access or disclosure. However, an unauthorized access to 
information relating to the representation of a client may 
constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has not made 
reasonable efforts to prevent the access, even if a third party 
accessed the information unlawfully.
Comment on Rule 1.4
Communicating with Client
[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably 
consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish 
the client’s objectives. In some situations — depending on both 
the importance of the action under consideration and the 
feasibility of consulting with the client — this duty will require 
consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such 
as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the 
exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without 
prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act 
reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on 
the client’s behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that 
the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status 
of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the 
timing or the substance of the representation.  
[W] A lawyer who stores (or employs a third party provider to 
store) information related to the representation of a client, shall 
disclose a breach of the security of the system following discovery 
or notification of the breach in the security of the data to a client, 
whose confidential information was, or is reasonably believed to 
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The disclosure 
shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without 
unreasonable delay. 
